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Abstract—We implement and analyze highly stable PUFs using two random gate oxide breakdown mechanisms: plasma induced
breakdown and voltage stressed breakdown. These gate oxide breakdown PUFs can be easily implemented in commercial silicon
processes, and they are highly stable. We fabricated bit generation units for the stable PUFs on 99 testchips with 65nm CMOS bulk
technology. Measurement results show that the plasma induced breakdown can generate complete stable responses. For the voltage
stressed breakdown, the responses are with 0.12% error probability at a worst case corner, which can be effectively accommodated by
taking the majority vote from multiple measurements. Both PUFs show significant area reduction compared to SRAM PUF. We
compare methods for evaluating the security level of PUFs such as min-entropy, mutual information and guesswork as well as inter-
and intra-FHD, and the popular NIST test suite. We show that guesswork can be viewed as a generalization of min-entropy and mutual
information. In addition, we analyze our testchip data and show through various statistical distance measures that the bits are
independent. Finally, we propose guesswork as a new statistical measure for the level of statistical independence that also has an
operational meaning in terms of security.
Index Terms—Hardware Security, Gate Oxide Breakdown, Guesswork Analysis
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1 INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [28] have been con-sidered as promising security primitives for the Internet
of Things (IoT) for its lightweight hardware implementation.
PUFs can be exploited in a variety of applications, such as
identification [1] or secret key generation. The randomness
of a PUF is extracted from random uncontrollable process
variations, and its behavior, or Challenge Response Pair (CRP)
[3], is uniquely tied to a given device and is hard to predict
or replicate. Since the first physical unclonable identification
was fabricated in [4], extensive efforts have been devoted into
the area, and different silicon PUF implementations have been
proposed, including Arbiter PUF [5], Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF
[6], SRAM PUF [29], and many other variations. 1
The instability of a parametric PUF potentially limits the
practical application of a PUF. Since these PUFs are parametric,
they are in nature susceptible to environmental variations, and
the behavior of a PUF can be altered consistently in two differ-
ent environments. To make a PUF more stable, extra overhead
is required, including hardware or latency cost [31]. Techniques
such as error correction code (ECC) or helper data come with
the cost of extra hardware implementation or possible security
concerns [32].
Recently, a stability-guaranteed Locally Enhanced Defectiv-
ity PUF (LEDPUF) proposed in [33] shows completely stable
responses by utilizing random hard defect generated from
Directed Self Assembly (DSA) process. However, it is difficult to
fabricate given that DSA is not well accepted into commercial
silicon manufacturing yet. In [34] a reliable RRAM PUF with
actual PUF fabrication using Resistive Random Access Memory
(RRAM) is presented. However, an off-chip characterization of
the split current and offset for the sense amplifiers are required,
and the reliability results under voltage variations are not
reported, which can dramatically impact the stability. Another
reliable PUF using Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) is presented in
[35]. However, post calibration steps are still needed and the
randomness of the most stable responses was not reported.
In [36], the authors apply high voltage to induce gate oxide
1. This work is a significant extension of [30]
breakdown of transistors to extract stable randomness. How-
ever, a ”afterburn” phase is performed to all broken oxides to
enhance the stability, which would require additional hardware
and calibration. In [15], the authors intentionally introduce
oxide breakdown by violating antenna rules to generate stable
random bits. However, the response time may be long due to
the limited leakage current to charge the ID generation output
if no breakdown occurs.
A PUF designer needs to meet a desired security level
without using an excessive number of gates. The two most
dominant factors that can reduce the security level of a PUF are
bias of the PUF response as well as instability, that is, noise. For
this, various methods for evaluating how secure a PUF is have
been presented. Among the most popular methods are inter-
and intra-Fractional Hamming Distance (FHD) [6], as well as
the NIST test suite for random and pseudorandom number gen-
erators [7]. These methods do not require evaluating directly
the underlying probability mass function according to which a
PUF response is drawn. On the other hand, they do not provide
a single measure that quantifies the interplay between noise
and bias in terms of the security level; inter-FHD distance is
related to bias whereas intra-FHD can be related to noise, and
so when using these measures it is not clear whether a PUF
with 49% inter-FHD and 10% intra-FHD is more secure than a
PUF with 45% inter-FHD and 5% intra-FHD; the NIST test suite
is extremely sensitive to bias and does not take into account the
effect of noise. Other methods that rely on evaluation of the
underlying probability mass function are the min-entropy [27],
mutual information [8] and guesswork [33]. These methods
indeed incorporate the effect of noise and bias into a single
quantifiable measure.
1.1 Contributions
• We implement stable PUFs using randomness extracted
from the plasma induced oxide breakdown and the
voltage stressed oxide breakdown.
• Test structures violating antenna rules are fabricated
with 65nm CMOS bulk technology. Measured results
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2from 99 testchips show that the responses are highly
stable across combinations of voltage (0.8V, 1.0V, 1.2V)
and temperature variations (25°C, 100°C). Compared to
a practical SRAM PUF, significant area reduction can be
achieved from eliminating ECC implementation for the
highly stable responses.
• We analyze the data from these testchips and show
based on various statistical distance measures that pairs
of bits with the same antenna ratio as well as bits that
are located next to each other are effectively statistically
independent. We also propose to use guesswork as a
new measure for statistical distance that has operational
meaning in terms of security.
• We discuss various methods for evaluating the security
level of PUFs such as min-entropy, guesswork, inter- and
intra-FHD as well as the NIST test suite. In addition, we
present the merits of guesswork as a method to evaluate
the security level of a PUF. Furthermore, we present
the tradeoff between hardware size, bias and guesswork
based on our measured results from 99 testchips.
2 STABLE PUFS USING GATE OXIDE BREAKDOWN
In this section, we first introduce the gate oxide breakdown and
describe two approaches exploiting the gate oxide breakdown
as randomness sources of stable PUFs, followed by PUF bit
generation and attack resilience analysis.
2.1 Gate Oxide Breakdown
Gate oxide breakdown is detrimental to metal-oxide-
semiconductor (MOS) devices because it can cause significant
drifts of transistor parameters. The breakdown can be catego-
rized into two types: soft breakdown and hard breakdown,
where both mechanisms introduce significant sudden increase
of the leakage current. For soft breakdown, the conducting path
from gate to the substrate is formed by the charged traps in
the gate oxide. Once there is conduction, new traps begin to
accumulate due to thermal damage, which in turn increases the
conductance. The positive feedback eventually leads to thermal
runway and oxide is physically melt in the breakdown spot.
This type of breakdown is called hard breakdown. The gate
leakage current of an oxide with both soft and hard breakdown
can be 100X larger than the leakage current of an oxide without
breakdown.
2.2 Plasma Induced Gate Oxide Breakdown
During silicon wafer fabrication, plasma processes are widely
used for etching, photoresist stripping, or ion implantation.
In the plasma ambient, metal segments, VIAs, or polysilicon
electrodes, which are the antenna segments, can be electrically
charged by ions or electrons, and therefore produce the antenna
voltage. For the antenna segments connected to the gate inputs,
the resulting electrical stress from the antennas can potentially
damage the underlying gate oxide and create a conducting
path from the gate to the substrate. The phenomenon is called
plasma induced gate oxide breakdown, or the antenna effect.
Though the maximum voltage rise can be modeled, the
actual voltage still cannot be predicted because the exact motion
and amounts of ions and electrons collected by the antenna
segment are random and unpredictable. The higher the gate
voltage is, the higher the probability for the gate oxide break-
down to occur, thus causing a device to fail. Also, systematic
plasma variation across wafer does not have much impact on
the local randomness because the variation is negligible to a
die.
To avoid the antenna effect, design rules of the antenna ratio
(AR) as shown in equation (1) must be strictly followed during
fabrication. Practical design rules of AR range from 100 to 5000
depending on the process details.
AR =
exposed antenna area
gate oxide area
(1)
Since both soft breakdown and hard breakdown can induce
about 100X or more leakage current than a good oxide, they
are both considered as breakdown in our proposed stable
PUF construction. Since the process parameters of our testchip
fabrication are unknown prior manufacturing, we implemented
a variety of antenna ratios to measure breakdown probabilities,
which are presented in Section 3.2. While foundries try to avoid
antenna effect during manufacturing, we exploit the uncontrol-
lable physical phenomena as another randomness source of a
stable PUF.
2.3 Voltage Stressed Gate Oxide Breakdown
The purpose of antenna rules is to protect all transistors from
having deviated parameters, for example 20% gate leakage
increase at 1.4xVDD [9], which could be harmful for a nor-
mal fabrication but still far from causing a real breakdown.
Therefore, to introduce a noticeable plasma induced breakdown
(100X increase of leakage current) with 50% probability of
a transistor, an AR larger than 1000X antenna rule may be
required, which can result in large area overhead.
To avoid using large antenna segments, one way is to apply
high voltage stress to the gate of a transistor directly. By voltage
stressing the gate terminal of a transistor, oxide breakdown
can be introduced with small AR or even without violating
the antenna rules. On the other hand, such a PUF construction
requires an additional stress step post manufacturing (or during
PUF enrollment). Please note the voltage stressed gate oxide
breakdown mechanism is different from the Erasable PUF
proposed in [10], where oxide breakdown is introduced to erase
targeted bit cells instead of being used as a stable source of
randomness.
2.4 Stable Signal Unit Construction
The permanent gate oxide breakdown mechanism, which can
be caused by plasma damage or voltage stressed damage, is
used to construct a Stable Signal Unit (SSU) as a source of
permanent defectivity. A SSU is a p-MOS transistor designed to
violate antenna rules, and its drain, source, and bulk terminals
are connected to capture the effect of the gate oxide breakdown
at all possible locations. Similar to a gate oxide breakdown
model given in [11], the SSU is attached in series to a precision
resistor as given in Fig. 1, where Fig. 1 (a) shows a SSU
without oxide breakdown and Fig. 1 (b) shows a SSU with oxide
breakdown. If no breakdown occurs as depicted in Fig. 1 (a),
the device is essentially a capacitor or a resistor much larger
than the precision resistor, thus the output voltage would be
lower than 50% VDD when the evaluation signal EVA is VDD;
if a breakdown happens, as shown in Fig. 1 (b), the device can
be seen as resistors much smaller than the precision resistor,
thus the output voltage would be higher than 50% VDD when
EVA is VDD. The resistance of the precision resistor (10MΩ)
is determined by actual measurements from 99 testchips as
described in Section 3.2.
2.5 Attack Resilience
It is worth mentioning that the SSU is more secure than an
antifuse cell because an antifuse cell is programmed with hard
breakdown only, while the output of the SSU is decided by
both soft breakdown and hard breakdown, and a soft break-
down is much harder to detect than a hard breakdown (albeit
3Fig. 1. Schematic of antenna SSU attached to a precision resistor.
possible for a very resourceful attacker). For probing attack,
the efficiency is limited by the mechanical constraints. For
imaging attacks, such as Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM),
Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM), or Electron Beam
Induced Currents (EBIC), it is difficult to efficiently identify a
soft breakdown because a soft breakdown because its physical
appearance is very similar to a fresh gate oxide without any
visible holes. It is also challenging for EBIC to identify a soft
breakdown because the limited current of a soft breakdown
can induce measurement noises, and the throughput of the
electron beam is low. Finally, it is also difficult to observe a
soft breakdown from a top-down or cross-section TEM because
the image does not effectively tell the depth of the traps.
3 TESTCHIP FABRICATION AND MEASUREMENT
3.1 SSU Implementations
The proposed SSUs are implemented and fabricated on 99
testchips with commercial 65nm GP 1P9M 6X1Z1U CMOS
bulk technology with 1V nominal voltage. The smallest gate
size (0.0072µm2) of the technology is used for all the SSUs. In
our testchips the fabricated SSUs intentionally violate antenna
rules by a few hundred times to a few thousand times on
different layers.
On each chip, 29 SSUs are implemented with 17 different
ARs, therefore the total number of SSU implementations is 2871
from 99 chips. For each of the SSUs, the cell area and detailed
antenna violation report are given in Table 1, where a zero indi-
cates that there is no antenna rule violation on such layer. The
antenna rule violation reports are provided to the foundry to
skip such design rule checks. The M T, V T, and P T structures
test the effects of metal, VIA, and polysilicon layers from small
AR to large AR, respectively. For each of the M T, V T, and
P T, two SSUs with same AR are implemented, therefore 24
bits of responses are obtained from these SSUs on a chip. The
remaining five test structures are of various combinations of
the violating layers, and one SSU is implemented for each of
the five test structures. In summary, on each chip, 29 bits are
measured, and 24 bits of them are obtained from the duplicated
12 structures of M T, V T, and P T.
3.2 Breakdown Probability Evaluation
To determine the gate oxide breakdown of a SSU, we use
Agilent 34411A Digital Multimeter to measure the equivalent
resistance Req of each SSU, and from the distribution of Req
we choose a proper precision resistor as shown in Fig. 1 to
determine whether or not an oxide breakdown has occurred.
Fig. 2 shows Req distribution of a SSU implementation (V T1)
with plasma induced and voltage stressed breakdown on 99
chips in an increasing order at 25°C, 1V. For both distributions,
the Req of a SSU implementation with oxide breakdown is at
least 100X smaller than a SSU without oxide breakdown. After
voltage stress, the Req are in general smaller and much more
oxide breakdowns are introduced. The results are similar for all
SSUs. The large gap in the figure can be effectively exploited to
generate stable digital signals from SSUs. Therefore, we choose,
TABLE 1
Cell area, accumulated areas of VIA, metal, polysilicon, and polysilicon
perimeter of SSUs fabricated. The numbers are in µm2 except for the
Poly Perimeter (µm). A zero indicates no antenna rule violation.
Cell VIA Metal Poly Poly Perimeter
M T1 36 0.87 1144.57 0.00 0.00
M T2 360 1.17 1468.57 0.00 0.00
M T3 1200 0.00 4398.88 0.00 0.00
M T4 4800 0.16 36781.89 0.00 0.00
V T1 2.4 0.87 1108.57 0.00 0.00
V T2 8 2.31 1108.57 0.00 0.00
V T3 90 15.27 1185.66 0.00 0.00
V T4 804 144.91 1895.05 0.00 0.00
P T1 4.8 1.26 1917.53 0.00 0.00
P T2 27 1.26 1917.53 18.17 55.59
P T3 203 1.26 1917.53 180.07 128.43
P T4 1800 1.26 1917.53 1800.07 222.46
Test1 804 1071.86 5631.11 0.00 0.00
Test2 4.7 1.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test3 80 0.26 299.20 0.00 0.00
Test4 60 20.84 318.78 28.07 83.81
Test5 118 54.40 617.25 56.39 164.72
according to the Req measurements, a 10MΩ precision resistor
to measure the gate oxide breakdown of each SSU.
Fig. 2. TheReq distribution of a SSU implementation (V T1) with plasma
induced and voltage stressed oxide damage on 99 chips at 25°C, 1V.
For the plasma induced breakdown, the results of break-
down probabilities of SSU implementations on 99 chips are
shown in Table 2. From the table we see that the breakdown
probability of each SSU after plasma induced oxide damage is
well below 50%. This means the responses of SSUs are highly
biased, which is undesirable for its low randomness in each
response bit. Using larger AR to further increase the breakdown
probability may not be a proper approach due to large area
overhead.
For the voltage stressed breakdown, we stress 24 SSUs (M T,
V T, and P T groups) on each testchip by applying 5.5V to
the EVA for 10 seconds. The results of the stress are shown in
Table 2. From the table we can see that breakdown probabilities,
which are only slightly correlated with the ARs, are elevated
to at least 50% even for the SSUs with the smallest ARs. These
results show that more unbiased responses compared to plasma
induced breakdown can be achieved by using small SSUs such
as V T1. Therefore, a SSU can be implemented with much
smaller area, possibly even without violating the antenna rule,
than the plasma induced breakdown approach.
3.3 Stability Evaluation
To evaluate the stability of the SSUs, we measure all SSU
responses from 99 chips at 6 corners: temperatures at 25°C and
100°C with ±20% voltage variation at 0.8V, 1V, and 1.2V.
4TABLE 2
Breakdown probability of 17 AR implementations on 99 testchips.
Plasma Induced Voltage Stressed
M T1 0.5% 57.6%
M T2 0.5% 51.5%
M T3 2.5% 57.1%
M T4 2.0% 51.0%
V T1 0.5% 50.0%
V T2 6.1% 54.0%
V T3 0.0% 64.7%
V T4 0.0% 58.6%
P T1 1.0% 50.5%
P T2 2.5% 51.5%
P T3 1.0% 58.6%
P T4 1.0% 60.0%
Test1 16.2% N/A
Test2 2.0% N/A
Test3 5.1% N/A
Test4 1.0% N/A
Test5 3.0% N/A
3.3.1 Plasma Induced Breakdown
For the plasma induced breakdown, all SSUs from 99 chips
(total 2871 bits generated) are completely stable at all corners
during multiple measurements. This can be explained by the
fact that the change of Req at different corners are limited. Fig.
3 shows the change of Req of a SSU (Test1) under voltage and
temperature variations. In Fig. 3 (a), the Req of the SSU with
breakdown is only a few KΩ and the changes under extreme
temperature and voltage variations are limited. On the other
hand, Fig. 3 (b) shows a SSU without oxide breakdown, where
the Req remains at less than 45MΩ, which is still orders of
magnitude larger than the SSU with oxide breakdown.
Fig. 3. Equivalent resistance under extreme voltage and temperature
variations. (a) SSU with oxide breakdown. (b) SSU without oxide break-
down.
3.3.2 Voltage Stressed Breakdown
Unlike the plasma induced breakdown, for the voltage stressed
breakdown, an extremely small portion of the SSUs are not
completely stable. To quantize the results of stability evaluation
for the voltage stressed breakdown, each SSU is measured 10
times at each corner and we define the responses measured at
25°C with 1V, where all responses are consistent, as the refer-
ence responses. A SSU is unstable at a corner if at least one of its
values from the 10 measurements is different from the reference
response. We define bit error rate (BER) the number of unstable
bits divided by 2376, which is the total number of SSUs stressed
(24 SSUs on each of the 99 chips). Table 3 shows the numbers
of unstable SSUs and BER at each corner. We found that at
several corners, 1 to 3 SSUs out of 2376 SSUs implemented
are unstable for the voltage stressed breakdown. Since most
responses of unstable SSUs are still consistent with the reference
responses, taking the majority vote of multiple measurements
can effectively eliminate the erroneous responses.
TABLE 3
Bit Error Rates of 2376 SSUs of the voltage stressed breakdown at 6
corners.
Corners 0.8V 1V 1.2V
25°C 0.04% 0.00% 0.12%
100°C 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
3.4 Uniqueness Evaluation
The inter-Fractional Hamming Distance (FHD) [12] is calcu-
lated as the uniqueness evaluation of SSUs. Consider the 24
voltage stressed SSUs on each chip as a 24-bit weak PUF, the
distribution of inter-FHD of 99 chips are presented in Fig. 4.
The average of inter-FHD is 51.7% and the standard deviation
is 11.4%, where for an ideal Binomial distribution with success
probability P=0.5, the mean is 50% and the standard deviation
is 10.2%. Please note that the results of uniqueness evaluation
are focused on the voltage stressed breakdown SSUs because
for the plasma induced breakdown SSUs, the responses are
highly biased and post processing would be required to extract
randomness, for example using OR gates at the outputs of
multiple SSUs to generate an unbiased bit as explained in
Section 4.1.
Fig. 4. Inter-FHD distribution of voltage stressed SSUs on 99 chips
overlaid with an ideal Binomial distribution curve with success probability
P=0.5.
3.5 Statistical Analysis of the PUF Responses
We evaluate the statistical dependence between pairs of bits
generated by SSUs after voltage stressed oxide breakdown
using various statistical distance measures. We consider pairs
as we have only 99 bits per location, and so going beyond
the pairwise probability mass function can lead to more noisy
and less reliable evaluation. We are interested in the level of
independence because the more independent the bits are, the
more secure the PUF is.
Essentially, we use that data to evaluate the pairwise prob-
ability mass functions of bits under the following two restric-
tions: The pairwise probability mass function of bits that have
the same antenna ratio; the pairwise probability mass function
of bits that are located next to each other. This in turn enables us
to evaluate the statistical dependence of element that are more
likely to be statistically dependent, that is, statistical depen-
dence due to similar design rules as well statistical dependence
between PUFs that are close together.
We calculate the distance between the evaluated prob-
ability mass function (i.e., PX,Y (x, y)) and an independent
one with the same marginal probability mass functions (i.e.,
PX (x) ·PY (y)) by assigning them to various statistical distance
measures. This enables us to demonstrate the level of indepen-
dence between pairs of bits. The results are presented in Table
4 for the following statistical distance measures: The Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence [8] which is defined as
D (PX ||QX) =
∑
x∈X
PX (x) log2 (PX (x) /QX (x)) (2)
5TABLE 4
Statistical distances based on the collected data. In each entry the left
side represents the statistical distance of bits that are located next to
each other, whereas the right side represents the distance of bits that
have the same antenna ratio.
Statistical Distance Max Min Mean
KL 0.11/0.057 0.0002/0.0001 0.022/0.015
TVD 0.19/0.13 0.009/0.007 0.07/0.05
and total variation distance (TVD) [13]
δ (PX , QX) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX (x)−QX (x)|. (3)
Table 4 shows that the average statistical distance between
PX,Y (x, y) and PX (x) · PY (y) is very small across measures;
note that the maximum value of both of these measures is 1 for
binary random variables, and that these statistical distances are
equal to zero when the probability mass functions are identical.
Hence, these results indicate that this PUF response is very
close to being statistically independent.
Note that there are many other statistical distance measures
that can be used for this purpose and here we provide only a
sample of two of the most popular ones. The KL divergence
measures the distance between two probability functions in
terms of the increase in the average length of codewords when
compressing a source which is optimal under PX according to
QX , whereas the total variation distance is equal to normalized
distance between two probability functions in terms of the L1
norm. However, the operational meaning of these statistical
distances as well as many others cannot be directly related
to security; in Subsection 5.5 we propose guesswork as a new
statistical distance measure that has an operational meaning
from security perspective.
4 GATE OXIDE BREAKDOWN PUF IMPLEMENTATIONS
4.1 Plasma Induced Breakdown PUF
To reduce the bias in this structure, we propose to use OR gates
at the output of SSUs as a more area-efficient approach than
using even larger antenna segments, which shows limited im-
pact on increasing the breakdown probability. Fig. 5 (a) shows
an exemplary implementation of plasma induced breakdown
PUF. The on-chip 10MΩ precision resistor is shared between
two SSUs, where only one of EVA1 and EVA2 will be asserted.
Please note that a precision resistor can be shared by more than
two SSUs to reduce the effective area required per bit, but only
one of the SSUs is asserted at a time. The outputs of buffer gates
are determined by the breakdown of the SSU.
Take Test3 as an example. When 11 Test3 SSUs are ORed
together, the probability of generating a zero is (1 − 5.1%)11 =
56%, and the area is 880µm2, which is still more area-efficient
than a practical SRAM PUF implementation where (511,19,119)-
BCH is suggested to correct 15% error probability at different
corners [16]. For such SRAM PUF to generate 19 information
bits, the estimated BCH implementation is 12000 XOR gates
[23] or an area of 54000µm2 for the 65nm technology we used.
To generate the same number of 19 bits of response with
Test3, the estimated area is about 16720µm2. The comparison
shows that the SRAM PUF is more than 3X of size of the plasma
induced breakdown PUF. In addition, the ECC execution latency
is eliminated for the plasma induced breakdown PUF.
4.2 Voltage Stressed Breakdown PUF
The probability of voltage stressed breakdown is much higher
than the plasma induced breakdown, therefore no OR gates
are needed to reduce the response bias, but a stress path for
each SSU is required. Fig. 5 (b) shows an exemplary imple-
mentation of voltage stressed breakdown PUF. A precision
resistor is shared by 3 SSUs. Before response generation, the
PUF is stressed through the stress path and outputs of SSUs
are connected to GND with all EVA signals set to zero. Once
SSUs are stressed, a normal voltage is applied to the stress path
and one of the EVAs is asserted at a time for evaluation. To
generate a bit, approximately 1 inverter and 4 transistors are
needed, which translates to an area of only 4µm2 for 65nm
technology. The PUF can be stressed on chip, for example with
a charge pump with an area overhead of 12200µm2. Therefore,
to generate 19 bits of response, the total area is approximately
12276µm2, which is about 30% smaller than the plasma induced
breakdown PUF. As the number of bits increases, the area re-
duction becomes more evident since the charge pump is shared
among multiple bits. The PUF can also be stressed from outside
of the chip to save even more area, but an antifuse cell may be
needed at the stress path. To stress the PUF, the antifuse cell
has to be permanently programmed to closed state. Therefore,
if the antifuse cell is already in closed state before stress, it
means that the PUF has been contaminated and should be
discarded. Please note that if the PUF is stressed from outside
of the chip, an attacker may destroy the PUF or introduce
more breakdowns by further stressing the PUF, but the PUF is
not programmable or clonable because the breakdown of each
transistor cannot be controlled.
Fig. 5. (a) Plasma induced breakdown PUF implementation. (b) Voltage
stressed breakdown PUF implementation.
5 GUESSWORK FOR EVALUATING SECURITY
A PUF is expected to provide a certain security level; PUFs are
implemented in hardware and so it is desired to minimize the
hardware size required to achieve this security level. Therefore,
accurate tools for evaluating the security level as a function of
the hardware size are needed. Guesswork has been suggested
as a measure for the security level of PUFs [33] by connecting
PUF security to the framework of password security. In this
section we present guesswork along with other measures for
the security level of PUFs, and discuss differences between
those measures.
In many scenarios it is reasonable to assume that an attacker
can have multiple guesses through which he can try to find
a PUF response or alternatively learn its structure. Guesswork
can be used in order to evaluate the security level under various
types of attacks of this sort such as key stretching [24], the
guesswork of strong PUFs when bias is presented (e.g., when a
model building attack enables an attacker to better predict the
response of the next challenges), and the average number of
guesses for various probabilities of attack failure.
In this context it is important to note that in terms of the
attack model, it is assumed that the attacker can generate
6responses to challenges based on the statistical profile of the
PUF, but does not have access to the device itself (i.e., it is
not doing model building). Essentially it means that in this
section we focus on attacks against weak PUFs rather than
machine learning attacks against strong PUFs. Finally, we also
propose guesswork as a new measure for statistical distance
that quantifies from security perspective how close random
variables are to being statistically independent.
5.1 Some Background
The inherent random signature in the hardware determines
how hard it is to guess the response of a weak PUF. The
number of guesses required to correctly find the response is
termed guesswork [14], [26] and denoted by G (X), where X is
a random variable whose response is guessed. G (X) is also a
random variable where the probability of having G (x) guesses
is PX (x). The ρth moment of guesswork is
E (G (X)ρ) =
∑
x
G (x)ρ · PX (x) ρ > 0. (4)
and the ρth moment of the conditional guesswork is defined to
be
E (G (X|Y )ρ) =
∑
y
E (G (X|Y = y)ρ) · PY (y) , (5)
where G (X|Y = y) is the guesswork when Y = y. Further-
more, it has been shown [14] that a dictionary attack, that is,
guessing values in descending order in terms of the probability
mass function (i.e., the values of PX (x)) is optimal in the
sense that it minimizes any moment of guesswork as well as
maximizes the probability of guessing the right response within
a certain number of guesses.
Arikan [14] presented bounds for the ρth moment of the
optimal guesswork, G∗ (X|Y ), based on which he showed that
when X and Y are i.i.d., the exponential growth rate of the
optimal guesswork is
lim
m→∞
1
m
log2 (E (G
∗ (X|Y )ρ)) = ρ ·H 1
1+ρ
(X|Y ) (6)
where m is the size of X and Y , PX,Y (x, y) is the probability
that xi = x, yi = y, where xi, yi are the ith elements in X and
Y respectively, and
H 1
1+ρ
(X|Y ) = 1
ρ
log2
(∑
y
(∑
x
P (x, y)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ)
(7)
is Renyi’s conditional entropy with parameter 1
1+ρ
[14]. Note
that the average guesswork is achieved when ρ = 1/2 in
which case the growth rate is equal to H1/2 (X) = 2 ·
log2
(∑
x PX (x)
1/2
)
> H (X) = −∑x PX (x) · log2 (PX (x))
with equality only when PX is the uniform probability mass
function, that is, the rate at which the average guesswork in-
creases is larger than the Shannon entropy, which corresponds
to guessing over the typical set.
Note that although equation (6) is asymptotic in m, that is
(i.e., it considers the growth rate of guesswork) the guesswork
converges very fast to the exponential term, that is, it converges
very fast to 2ρ·H1/(1+ρ)(PX,Y (x,y))·m). It is also important to note
that just like guesswork, also min-entropy [27] and mutual
information [8] represent exponential growth rates that have
different operational meanings in terms of security.
5.2 A Review of Contemporary Security Measures for
PUFs
We divide the methods of evaluating the security level into two
groups. Methods that do not require a direct evaluation of the
probability mass function, and ones that do require this kind of
evaluation.
The main two methods for evaluating the security level
without estimating the probability mass function are as follows.
• Inter- and Intra-FHD: Calculating the inter- and intra-
FHD is a very popular method of evaluating the security
level [3], [6], [12]. The closer the average inter-FHD is to
50% the more unique a PUF is considered to be (i.e., the
PUF response is more balanced), whereas the smaller the
average intra-FHD distance is, the more reliable the PUF
response is, that is, it is more stable.
• NIST statistical test suite for random and pseudo-
random number generators: NIST offers a statistical
test suite [7] that enables to determine whether or not
a string of bits is random enough according to various
criteria. This approach can be taken for example when
considering PUF based pseudo-random number gener-
ators [25].
The other two methods for evaluating the security level that
rely on evaluating the underlying probability mass function are
the following.
• Mutual Information: The mutual information between
two random variables X and Y (i.e., I (X;Y )) quan-
tifies the amount of information that Y reveals on X
and vice versa. For example, when X and Y are in-
dependent I (X;Y ) = 0, whereas when X = Y then
I (X;Y ) = H (X) = H (Y ). Mutual information has
been proposed as a measure for the security level of
PUFs [17], [22].
• Min-entropy: In the context of guessing a secret, the
min-entropy [27] represents the maximum probability
of guessing a secret in a single guess. Since the PUF
response is a secret which is chosen at random, min-
entropy has also been proposed as a measure for the
security level [21]. In the context of machine learning
attacks min-entropy has been related to how quickly a
strong PUF can be broken [20]. Furthermore, it provides
a guarantee for the size of a uniformly distributed key
[19] that can be extracted.
5.3 The Merits of Guesswork
In this subsection we explain why guesswork can also be
considered as a good measure for the security level of PUFs
by going through each of the criteria presented in Subsection
5.2 and explaining what the differences between what they
evaluate and what guesswork does.
Guesswork and inter- and intra-FHD: The two elements
that affect the security level of a PUF are bias and noise. Inter-
FHD provides an evaluation of how biased a PUF is and intra-
FHD evaluates the noise level, but yet they do not provide
a single quantifiable measure that enables one to accurately
evaluate the interplay between the two. This in turn may lead
to an inaccurate evaluation of the security level that might result
in either designing a PUF of excessive size or a PUF that does
not meet the required security level.
On the other hand, Guesswork incorporates the effect of bias
and noise into a single measure that enables us to evaluate how
much they affect the security level. This interplay is presented
for the ρth moment of guesswork in [18] by the following
equation
limm→∞ 1m log2 (E (G
∗ (X,N)ρ)) = max
(
ρH 1
1+ρ
(X)− ρ ·H (N) , 0
)
, (8)
where G∗ (X,N) is the optimal guesswork when X is drawn
i.i.d. Bernoulli(p), where p ≤ 1/2, and the samples of the PUF
7encounter an additive noise which is drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(N),
whose entropy is H (N). This is proven in [18].
Therefore, when a PUF designer considers the following
two PUFs: A PUF with inter-FHD 50% and intra-FHD 10%;
another PUF with inter-FHD 45% and intra-FHD 5%, he can
not determine which one is more secure based on inter- and
intra-FHD. On the other hand, by assigning the bias and level
of noise to equation (8) he can see that when the noise level is
5% and bias is 35% (which leads to inter-FHD 45% when the
bits are i.i.d.) the average guesswork is equal to 2128·0.68 ≈ 287,
whereas when the noise is 10% and the bias is 50% the average
guesswork equals 2128·0.53 ≈ 268. Therefore, guesswork enables
a PUF designer to determine which one is more secure and by
how much; in this example the PUF with inter-FHD 35% and
intra-FHD 5% is 219 times more secure than the other one.
NIST statistical test suite: The main disadvantage of NIST
statistical test suite is that it does not designed to take into
consideration the effect of noise on the security level. Therefore,
a PUF with inter-FHD 50% and intra-FHD 0% (i.e., a stable
PUF), as well as a PUF with inter-FHD 50% and intra-FHD
50% (i.e., a maximally noisy PUF) will both pass the NIST test
suite.
Moreover, it determines whether or not a string is suf-
ficiently random compared to strings that are drawn i.i.d.
Bernoulli(1/2). Therefore, when there is any inherent bias (e.g.
the bits are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2− )) the PUF does not
pass these tests. However, the effect of small bias is extremely
small in terms of guesswork. This can be seen by assigning a
small bias to equation (8); for example, when the bits of a stable
PUF are drawn i.i.d. Bernoulli(0.45) the average guesswork is
equal to 2128·0.9964 ≈ 2127.
Mutual information and min-entropy: In many cases, an
attacker can have multiple guesses in which he tries to find
the PUF response or learn its structure. Guesswork provides
a framework through which a PUF designer can evaluate the
security level under such attacks.
Similarly to guesswork, mutual information and min-
entropy both incorporate noise and bias into a single expres-
sion. In fact, in the context of finding the correct response
to a challenge, mutual information and min-entropy are
both special cases of guesswork; hence, from this perspective,
guesswork can be viewed as a generalization of these two
methods.
Min-entropy is the exponent of the maximum probability
that the number of guesses is equal to 1 which is also the
probability that the optimal guesswork is equal to 1, that
is, in the i.i.d. case the min-entropy is
Hmin (X) = − log2 (max (PX)) = − 1m log2 (Pr (G (X) = 1)) . (9)
In addition, it is shown in [18] that min-entropy also cap-
tures the average guesswork for strong PUFs under model
building attacks.
In [18] it is also shown that the mutual information between
the initial PUF observation and a noisy one, is the average
guesswork when guessing across the typical set [8], that is, the
most probable set. In this case the probability that a PUF re-
sponse is outside this set is very close but not equal to 1, that is,
the average number of guesses is approximately 2128·(I(X;Y )+)
when the probability of attack failure is 2−128·, where   1.
Therefore, when it comes to guessing, mutual information is
the same as guessing with a very small probability of attack
failure; this is again a special case of guesswork. The bounds
in equation (8) are achieved when the attacker actually stops
when he successfully guesses the secret, even if he has to go
though all possibilities.
5.4 The Impact of Noise on the security level
In this subsection we evaluate the impact of noisy responses
in terms of the average guesswork of a fixed length response;
we consider guesswork for the same reasons provided in Sub-
section 5.3. We compare the voltage stressed breakdown PUF
presented in Section 4.2, whose noise level is 0.12%, to show
that it performs better than some weak PUFs that have been
reported in the literature [16] in terms of the average number
of guesses required to break them. For a 128-bit response
generated by a PUF, we define the number of effective bits
as
(
H1/2 (X)−H (N)
) × 128, that is, the effective number of
bits according to which the exponent of the average guesswork
increases when there is bias and noise as defined in equation
(8).
For the voltage stressed breakdown PUF,(
H1/2 (X)−H (N)
)
is 0.9866 as calculated from equation
(8) for its 0.12% noise level at a worst corner, therefore its
number of effective bits is 0.9866 × 128 = 126.3, which gives
an average guesswork of approximately 2126. For a weak
PUF with 15% error probability, the number of effective bits
is only 0.3902 × 128 = 49.9 with an average guesswork of
approximately 250. This means that our new proposed PUFs
present a significant improvement at this level in terms of the
average guesswork. Figure 6 shows the number of effective
bits for various noise levels. We can see that the number of
effective bits drops dramatically as the noise level increases,
which reflects how severe the noise can affect the security level
in terms of the average guesswork.
Fig. 6. Number of effective bits of a 128-bit responses with different error
probabilities.
5.5 Guesswork as a Statistical Distance Measure
In contrast with the previous subsections, which used guess-
work to evaluate the security level, in this subsection we pro-
pose guesswork as a new statistical measure that enables one
to measure the statistical distance between random variables.
The advantage of using guesswork as a statistical distance mea-
sure over other measures such as those presented in Subsection
3.5 lies in the fact that the number associated to this distance
has operational meaning in terms of security.
The new statistical distance is defined as follows:
G (PX,Y , PX · PY ) = log2E (G (X)
ρ)− log2E (G (X|Y ))ρ
log2E (G (X))
ρ
=
(
H1/(1+ρ) (X)−H1/(1+ρ) (X|Y )
)
/H1/(1+ρ) (X) .(10)
When G (PX,Y , PX · PY ) = α it means for large m that
E (G (X|Y )ρ) = (E (G (X)ρ))1−α . (11)
Hence, when X and Y are independent α = 0 and so
E (G (X)ρ) = E (G (X|Y )ρ), whereas X = Y leads to α = 1
as well as G (X|Y ) = 1 . We present G (PX,Y , PX · PY ) for our
evaluations of PX,Y and the marginals PX , PY when ρ = 1
(i.e., the average guesswork) in Table 5. These results show
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In each entry the left side represents the statistical distance of bits that
are located next to each other, whereas the right side represents the
distance of bits that have the same antenna ratio.
Statistical Distance Max Min Mean
GW 0.06/0.029 0.0001/0.00009 0.011/0.008
that when X is conditioned on Y there is a loss of about
1% on average in terms of the exponent of E (G (X)), that is,
when E (G (X)) = 2m, E (G (X|Y )) = 20.99·m. Therefore, the
statistical statistical dependence between X and Y is very weak
in terms of guesswork.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we implement and analyze highly stable PUFs
exploiting uncontrollable plasma induced and voltage stressed
gate oxide damage. The proposed SSUs are fabricated and
measured from 99 testchips. Measurement results show that the
SSUs are highly stable, therefore significant area reduction can
be achieved by eliminating ECC implementation. Furthermore,
we show that the responses are unbiased and unique, and
we analyze the data of our testchips using various statistical
distance measures to show that these bits are independent.
Finally, we present the merits of guesswork as a measure for
evaluating the security level of PUFs.
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